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JUDICIAL SELECTION AS ... TALK RADIO 
Michael J. Gerhardt * 
This Symposium allows me the opportunity to reconsider the 
analogy that best fits judicial selection. In a series of essays, I 
previously considered analogizing judicial selection to war. 1 This 
was an especially apt analogy because confirmation contests often 
resemble military conflicts in their deployment of guerrilla tactics 
and the take-no-prisoners approaches of the contending sides.2 A 
major reason for the intensifying combat over judicial selection is 
that we are in the midst of the second longest period in our his-
tory without a vacancy arising on the Supreme Court.3 National 
political leaders are terribly anxious over who will get to make 
the next appointment to the Court and thus perhaps be able to 
determine, for some time to come, how the Court will decide the 
many divisive questions of constitutional law that it and it alone 
is empowered to decide.4 1t is no accident that President Reagan's 
and President George H.W. Bush's appointees continue to domi-
* Arthur B. Hanson Professor of Law, College of William & Mary, Marshall-Wythe 
School of Law; Visiting Fellow, James Madison Program in American Ideals and Institu-
tions, Princeton University, Spring 2004. B.A., 1978, Yale University; M.Sc., 1979, London 
School of Economics; J.D., 1982, University of Chicago Law School. 
1. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Supreme Court Selection as War (pt. 1), 50 DRAKE L. 
REV. 393 (2002); Michael J. Gerhardt, Judicial Selection as War (pt. 2), 36 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 667 (2003) [hereinafter Gerhardt, Judicial Selection as War); Michael J. Gerhardt, 
Judicial Selection as War, Part Three: The Role of Ideology (pt. 3), 15 REGENT U. L. REV. 
15 (2002). 
2. See, e.g., Gerhardt, Judicial Selection as War, supra note 1, at 674-79 (describing 
the judicial appointment tactics of several "warrior presidents"). 
3. See, e.g., Charles Lane & Amy Goldstein, At High Court, a Retirement Watch; 
Rehnquist, O'Connor Top List of Possibilities as Speculation on Replacement Grows, WASH. 
POST, June 17, 2001, at A4 (stating that the last time the membership in the Supreme 
Court changed was the 1994 appointment of Justice Stephen Breyer, "creating the second-
longest period of stability in the court's history and pent-up anxiety about when the next 
vacancy will occur"); Charlie Savage, Win May Bring Power to Appoint 4 Justices; Cam· 
paigns Urged to Focus on Impact, BOSTON GLOBE, July 7, 2004, at A3 ("The decade since 
the confirmation of Justice Stephen Breyer is the second-longest interval without a va-
cancy in American history a period just shy of the 11-year record for Supreme Court stabil-
ity, from 1812 to 1823."). 
4. See generally Savage, supra note 3, at A3. 
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nate the Rehnquist Court, and this circumstance is not lost on 
President George W. Bush, the Democrats, and their supporters.5 
More recently, I have considered analogizing the federal judi-
cial selection process to a bad dream.6 Confirmation contests have 
become frightening in their intensity, and anyone who cares 
about the process is bound to lose sleep over the ease with which 
negative lessons can be derived from the futility of reforming it. I 
have pointed to a number of positive lessons that can be found 
within the process if only one dares to look for them. 7 The fact 
that "conflictO [is] a choice rather than an inevitability" calls at-
tention to the discretion and political accountability of our lead-
ers.8 Knowing that fact might be reassuring, at least for those 
who believe that the political checks within the system still work. 
To be sure, the responses of our leaders and commentators to 
the friction within the process are, for the most part, predictable. 
Republicans and Democrats accuse each other of grievous, un-
precedented wrongs within the process.9 Each accuses the other 
of triggering a crisis in judicial selection.10 As someone who has 
written a good deal about federal judicial selection, I have won-
dered whether things are really as awful as they sound. As I have 
listened to, observed, and participated in the process, I have also 
begun to wonder whether what I have heard is the sound in the 
halls of our Congress of ... Talk Radio. The more I have pondered 
the analogy between Talk Radio and judicial selection, the more 
sense it makes to me. And the more sense it makes to me, the 
5. See James E. DiTullio & John B. Schochet, Note, Saving This Honorable Court: A 
Proposal to Replace Life Tenure on the Supreme Court with Staggered, Nonrenewable 
Eighteen·Year Terms, 90 VA. L. REV. 1093, 1110-11 (2004); see also Lane & Goldstein, su· 
pra note 3, at A4; Savage, supra note 3, at A3; Press Release, John Kerry Campaign, Bush 
Plays Politics with Judges Today (July 7, 2004), at http://www.johnkerry.com/pressroom/ 
releases/pr_2004_0707b.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2005). 
6. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Confirmation Dreams, 2004 JURIST 'II 2 (Apr. 15, 2004), 
at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/symposium-jc/gerhardt.php (last visited Jan. 29, 2005). 
7. See id. 
8. Id. 
9. See Patrick Leahy, Joseph Lieberman, William Rehnquist, Edward Kennedy & 
John Cornyn, From the Bag: Irrecusable & Unconfirmable, 7 GREEN BAG 2d 277 (2004) 
(containing various pieces of correspondence between these political and judicial figures 
concerning judicial selection). 
10. See id.; see also John Cornyn, Our Broken Judicial Confirmation Process and the 
Need for Filibuster Reform, 27 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL 'y 181 (2003); Nick Anderson, Battle 
over Judiciary Enters New Phase, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2003, at A16; Alison Mitchell, New 
Senate Leader Agrees to Hold Votes on 2 Judicial Issues, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2001, at 
A20. 
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more I have worried about the quality and civility of constitu-
tional dialogue within our national political process. As a teacher 
and father, I am particularly troubled about what young people 
and the general public might take away from what they hear in 
the vicious debates over judicial nominations. 
Talk Radio ought to be familiar to just about everyone. It has 
become a phenomenon over the past few decades and involves the 
broadcasting equivalent of political pamphleteering. Talk Radio 
hosts engage in nothing more or less than partisan polemics. 
While they purport to be purveying the truth or facts, their spe-
cialty is the broadcast of soft news, or speculation and commen-
tary.11 Republicans largely dominate this forum, just as they 
largely dominate the federal political process by virtue of their oc-
cupancy of the presidency and majorities in the House and the 
Senate.12 Below, I hope to illustrate various ways in which the 
rhetoric in confirmation contests has begun to resemble Talk Ra-
dio, followed by brief discussions of the possible causes of and 
possible remedies for the collapse of the judicial selection process 
into Talk Radio. 
I. 
The hallmarks of Talk Radio are not difficult to identify. They 
include a regrettable decline in the quality (and civility) of public 
discourse, demonizing the other side, paranoia (in dividing the 
world into "us" and "them"), and proliferating unthinking and un-
founded overgeneralizations. 
The rhetoric in recent confirmation contests reflects all of these 
attributes of Talk Radio. First, and foremost, there has been a 
distressing degeneration in the quality of the debate. 13 Each of 
the contending sides in confirmation contests must take some re-
sponsibility for this decline. Indeed, each side blames the other 
11. BILL KOVACH & TOM ROSENSTIEL, WARP SPEED: AMERICA IN THE AGE OF MIXED 
MEDIA 59-60 (1999). 
12. See Howard Kurtz, Laura Ingraham, Reporting for W2004, WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 
2004, at Cl. The key word is "largely," for neither party is immune from lapsing into Talk 
Radio in the course of disagreements over judicial nominations. 
13. See, e.g., John Cornyn, Restoring Our Broken Judicial Confirmation Process, 8 
TEX. REV. L. & POL. 1, 3-4 (2003). 
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for the decline and for intellectual dishonesty and hypocrisyY 
You need not listen to much Talk Radio in order to know that it is 
filled with a good deal of intellectual dishonesty and hypocrisy, 
but we expect more, or ought to expect more, from our political 
leaders. Even so, three examples illustrate the poor quality of 
constitutional argumentation in confirmation skirmishes. The 
first is the switch in the major parties' positions on the constitu-
tionality of the filibuster, by which I mean endless debate permit-
ted by the Senate rules and intended to protract and sometimes 
to preclude floor votes. 15 Republicans have been absolutely irate 
over the Democrats' filibusters of ten of President Bush's judicial 
nominations. 16 In response to the filibusters, the Senate Majority 
Leader Bill Frist and some other Republican senators have pro-
posed dismantling the filibuster, and propose adopting the De-
mocrats' own initiatives during the 1990s to reform the filibus-
terP Democrats are quick to point out that nothing came from 
their proposals because the Republican leadership rejected them 
all and stood steadfastly by the filibusterY Neither side can es-
cape the appearance of hypocrisy on this issue, while both sides in 
recent debates over the filibuster relish citing supporting state-
ments for their positions from the other.19 
A second example of the poor quality of argumentation is the 
Republicans' insistence that the filibusters against President 
Bush's nominees are "unprecedented."20 This is only true if you 
14. Compare Press Release, Office of Senator Patrick Leahy, Setting the Record 
Straight on Judicial Nominations in North Carolina and Across the Country (July 7, 
2004), at http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200407/070704a.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2005), 
with Comyn, supra note 13, at 2. 
15. See Comyn, supra note 13, at 3. 
16. See, e.g., Nick Anderson & Richard Simon, Debate Marathon Over Judges Ends, 
but the Battle Goes On, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2003, at A12; Helen Dewar, Senate Democrats 
Block 3 More Bush Judicial Nominees, WASH. POST, July 23, 2004, at A5; Helen Dewar, 
Senate Partisanship Worst in Memory, Key Legislation Languishes as Democrats andRe-
publicans Jockey for Power, WASH. POST, May 2, 2004, at A5; Helen Dewar, Senate Fili-
buster Ends with Talk of Next Stage in Fight, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 2003, at A9; Neil A. 
Lewis, Marathon in the Senate: The Talk is Long, but Temper Short, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 
2003, at A24; Neil A. Lewis, Angered by Filibusters on Nominees, Republicans Stage Their 
Own Protest, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2003, at A29. 
17. See S. Res. 138, 108th Cong. (2003); see also 149 CONG. REC. S8843 (daily ed. June 
27, 2003) (statement of Sen. Frist). 
18. See 149 CONG. REC. S6614-17 (daily ed. May 19, 2003) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
19. See, e.g., id. at S6614. 
20. See, e.g., 149 CONG. REC. S11,107 (daily ed. Sept. 4, 2003) (statement of Sen. Ses-
sions); 149 CONG. REC. S14,528 (daily ed. Nov. 12, 2003) (statement of Sen. Frist); see also 
149 CONG. REC. S14,533 (daily ed. Nov. 12, 2003) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (describing the 
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ignore history.21 Indeed, you need only go back to the prior decade 
for proof of the falsehood of this statement. For, in the 1990s, Re-
publican senators, including the current Majority Leader, sup-
ported filibusters of judicial and other nominations.22 Two of the 
filibusters worked-those against the nominations of Sam Brown 
as Ambassador and Henry Foster as Surgeon General.23 While all 
of the filibusters against judicial nominations ultimately failed to 
block floor votes, it is hard to deny-at least with a straight 
face-that a filibuster is a filibuster is a filibuster. Its constitu-
tionality does not depend on its success. Even if it did, Republi-
cans cannot deny that a filibuster ended Abe Fortas's nomination 
as Chief Justice in 1968.24 At least one Republican witness pro-
posed, without any contradiction from Republican senators, dis-
tinguishing the Fortas filibuster on the ground that it was "bipar-
tisan."25 This argument does not pass what lawyers sometimes 
call "the straight face test."26 It makes no sense why the constitu-
tionality of the filibuster depends somehow on the political par-
ties of the senators supporting it. Even if this were the case, the 
current filibusters are bipartisan, because Jim Jeffords, an Inde-
pendent, has voted for them.27 It is not clear why a genuinely "bi-
partisan" filibuster must have the support of members of both the 
major parties. Nor is it clear why an Independent is not techni-
recent filibuster trend as something that has happened "never [before) in the history of 
this country"). 
21. See, e.g., 149 CONG. REC. S14,687 (daily ed. Nov. 12, 2003) (statement of Sen. 
Leahy); 149 CONG. REC. S5907 (daily ed. May 8, 2003) (statement of Sen. Leahy); 149 
CONG. REC. S3337 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 2003) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
22. See, e.g., 149 CciNG. REC. S5911 (daily ed. May 8, 2003) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
23. ld. 
24. See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF 
APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT 297-98 (3d ed. 1992); see also JOHN ANTHONY 
MALTESE, THE SELLING OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES 139 (1995); Oona A. Hathaway, 
Note, The Politics of the Confirmation Process, 106 YALE L.J. 235, 236 (1996). 
25. Judicial Nominations, Filibusters, and the Constitution: When a Majority is De-
nied its Right to Consent: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights 
and Property Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. 3--4 
(May 6, 2003), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/databases.html (last visited Feb. 6, 
2005) (statement of Sen. Cornyn) [hereinafter Judicial Nominations Hearing). 
26. See, e.g., Peter Jeremy Smith, Commas, Constitutional Grammar, and the 
Straight-Face Test: What if Conan the Grammarian Were a Strict Textualist?, 16 CONST. 
COMMENT. 7, 29 (1999). 
27. See United States Senate, U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes JOBth Congress-1st Ses-
sion: Vote Number 450 (Nov. 14, 2003), at http://www.senate.gov/legislative!LIS/roll_call_ 
lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=108&session=l&vote=00450 (last visited Jan. 22, 
2005) (showing Jim Jeffords, Independent, voting against a motion to invoke cloture on a 
U.S. Circuit judge nomination). 
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cally different from Democrats for purposes of the constitutional-
ity of the filibuster. Moreover, Republicans have distinguished 
their successful filibusters of President Clinton's nominations of 
Sam Brown as Ambassador and Henry Foster as Surgeon Gen-
eral on the ground that these were not filibusters of judicial 
nominations, which are unique because they involve the third 
branch.28 It is, however, hard to see why this distinction makes a 
difference for constitutional purposes. After all, the Constitution 
provides that the President, with the advice and consent of the 
Senate, may appoint "Officers of the United States," including 
judges and certain other high-ranking officials.29 The Constitu-
tion does not set up, in other words, a separate or distinct ap-
pointment process for federal judges; they are subject, by virtue of 
the uniform text, to the same constitutional procedures for ap-
pointments as every other officer of the United States.30 Pre-
sumably, this includes being subject as well to Article I's grant to 
each chamber of the Congress the authority to devise its own 
rules for its respective proceedings.31 There is nothing in either 
Article I or the Appointments Clause directing that judges may 
not be subject to the same procedural rules as other nominations 
for appointment purposes.32 
My third example comes from hearings before the Senate Judi-
ciary and Rules Committees at which I testified last summer. I 
testified and presented a written statement on behalf of the con-
stitutionality of the filibuster, 33 while Republican witnesses ar-
gued that it was unconstitutional.34 There are quite credible ar-
guments against the constitutionality of the filibuster,35 but the 
28. See generally 149 CONG. REC. S3442 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 2003) (statement of Sen. 
Leahy) (describing the Republicans' efforts to filibuster Executive Branch nominees). 
29. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
30. See id. 
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. 
32. Compare U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. 
33. Judicial Nominations Hearing, supra note 25, at 26-28, 265-76 (testimony and 
statement of Michael Gerhardt, Arthur B. Hanson Professor of Law, College of William & 
Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of Law). 
34. See, e.g., id. at 16-19 (testimony of Sen. Arlen Specter). 
35. See Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181, 
247 (1997) (arguing that entrenchment of the filibuster violates the principles that "[o]ne 
legislature cannot bind subsequent legislatures" and examining the constitutionality of 
the modern filibuster); see also Michael J. Gerhardt, Norm Theory and the Future of the 
Federal Appointments Process, 50 DUKE L.J. 1687, 1708 (2001); John C. Roberts & Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Entrenchment of Ordinary Legislation: A Reply to Professors Posner and 
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Republican witnesses did not limit themselves to these. I had ar-
gued, among other things, that the filibuster was constitutional 
for the same reasons as other procedures within the Senate allow-
ing small minorities, such as committee chairs, to sometimes 
make what are final decisions on the fates of nominees.36 I 
pointed out that the Chair of the Judiciary Committee, acting 
alone, had prevented his committee as well as the Senate from 
acting on more than sixty of President Clinton's judicial nomina-
tions.37 In response, Republican witnesses argued that these pro-
cedures, too, must be unconstitutional, with no Republican on the 
Constitution Subcommittee coming to the defense of the Chair of 
the Judiciary Committee, Senator Orrin Hatch.38 I was the only 
witness who defended the constitutionality of all of Senator 
Hatch's actions as Chair of the Judiciary Committee in the 
1990s.39 
The second way in which confirmation contests resemble Talk 
Radio is that senators (or their staffs) will demonize the opposi-
tion.40 Recall the famous advertisement that warned people about 
"Robert Bork's America."41 Recall, as well, how ultimately suc-
cessful nominee Clarence Thomas turned the tables on his oppo-
sition by denouncing their responsibility for his hearings becom-
ing "'a high-tech lynching."'42 The Senate, by a vote strictly along 
party lines, rejected the nomination to a district court of Missouri 
Supreme Court Justice Ronnie White, whom some senators de-
Vermeule, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1773, 1780-81 (2003); Benjamin Lieber & Patrick Brown, Note, 
On Supermajorities and the Constitution, 83 GEO. L.J. 2347, 2382 (1995). See generally 
Judicial Nominations Hearing, supra note 25, at 1-63. 
36. Judicial Nominations Hearing, supra note 25, at 266 (statement of Michael 
Gerhardt, Arthur B. Hanson Professor of Law, College of William & Mary, Marshall-
Wythe School of Law). 
37. See id. at 272-73. 
38. See id. at 10-46 (testimony of various witnesses). 
39. See id. at 272-73 (statement of Michael Gerhardt, Arthur B. Hanson Professor of 
Law, College of William & Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of Law). 
40. See, e.g., 133 CONG. REC. S9188 (daily ed. July 1, 1987) (statement of Sen. Ken-
nedy) (stating that Robert Bork, who had been nominated to the Supreme Court, had an 
"ominous" mindset). 
41. See id. 
42. Mark C. Niles, Clarence Thomas: The First Ten Years Looking for Consistency, 10 
AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL 'y & L. 327, 335 (2002) (quoting Mortimer B. Zuckerman, Black 
and White in America, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 28, 1991, at 92); see also Erwin 
Chemerinsky, October Tragedy, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1497, 1511 (1992); Yxta Maya Murray, 
The Cultural Implications of Judicial Selection, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 374, 393 (1994) (re-
viewing TONI MORRISON, RACE-lNG JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA 
HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY (1992)). 
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nounced as being soft on crime and opposed to the death penalty 
(in spite of some evidence to the contrary).43 Racism is almost the 
worst charge that can ever be made against a nominee. 44 Perhaps 
the worst thing to be called is a "liberal," while Democrats some-
times try to soften the support or even defeat a nomination by 
suggesting the nominee is a "right-wing ideologue."45 Republicans 
complain that Democrats are now responsible for the worst "cri-
sis" in the history of federal judicial selection, 46 even though De-
mocrats have joined in approving, at a record pace, record num-
bers of the President's judicial nominees.47 
A third way in which judicial selection resembles Talk Radio is 
paranoia, or strong resistance to acknowledging that the other 
side is capable of doing something good in the process. It is not 
unusual for the contending sides in Senate debates to make refer-
ence to "us" and "them."48 ''We" are the good guys, because we are 
on the side of all that is good, while "they" are almost always the 
bad guys responsible for whatever ails the Congress.49 In recent 
debates over the filibuster, Republicans denounced Democrats for 
being un-American in opposing the great principle of "majority 
rule,"50 while Democrats roundly complained that Republicans 
were simply interested in facilitating "tyranny of the majority."51 
Fourth, recent confirmation contests increasingly resembled 
Talk Radio in the opposing sides' deployment of unthinking and 
unfounded generalizations.52 One of the most common is to accuse 
a targeted nominee of being an activist, even though the person 
43. 150 CONG. REC. S5576-77 (daily ed. May 18, 2004) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
44. Cf 150 CONG. REC. S172 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
45. 149 CONG. REC. S10,199 (daily ed. July 30, 2003) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
46. Sen. John Comyn, Falsities on the Senate Floor, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, Nov. 13, 
2003, at http://www.nationalreview.com/commenUcornyn200311131044.asp (last visited 
Jan. 22, 2005); see also 149 CONG. REC. S14,528 (daily ed. Nov. 12, 2003) (statement of 
Sen. Frist) (describing the norms for federal judicial selection as having been "shattered"). 
47. 150 CONG. REC. S7744 (daily ed. July 7, 2004) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
48. See, e.g., 149 CONG. REC. S14,528 (daily ed. Nov. 12, 2003) (statement of Sen. 
Frist); 149 CONG. REC. S10,199 (daily ed. July 30, 2003) (statement of Sen. Leahy); 
Cornyn, supra note 46. 
49. See, e.g., 149 CONG. REC. S14,528 (daily ed. Nov. 12, 2003) (statement of Sen. 
Frist); 149 CONG. REC. 810,199 (daily ed. July 30, 2003) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
50. See 149 CONG. REC. S2644 (daily ed. Feb. 25, 2003) (statement of Sen. Domenici); 
see also Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 35, at 185 ("[The filibuster's] net effect seems ... 
to undermine majority rule."). 
51. 149 CONG. REC. S3678 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 2003) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). 
52. See 150 CONG. REC. S8531 (daily ed. July 21, 2004) (statement of Sen. Stabenow). 
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may never have been a judge or might have disavowed any incli-
nation towards activist decision-making on the bench. 53 Neverthe-
less, each side accuses the other of trying to appoint "activists" to 
the bench.54 An activist is someone who would legislate from the 
bench, presumably striking down the policies he dislikes and ap-
proving those he likes. 55 
This rhetoric is disturbing for at least two reasons. The first is 
what it is likely to lead neutral, uninformed, or non-partisan ob-
servers to think about our political process. It is likely that they 
will wonder whether both sides are correct. If so, the rhetoric 
merely confirms what social scientists have argued for years-
namely, that judges are merely policymakers who wear robes. 56 
They argue that judges do one of two things when they decide 
cases-they either vote their policy preferences directly or ma-
nipulate the law in order to facilitate their personal or policy ob-
jectives. 57 Without a doubt, both sides in confirmation contests 
appear to be trying to do the same thing-control judicial out-
comes. Imagine what law students must wonder when they wit-
ness these events, for each side argues that the other is interested 
in appointing people who will merely vote to uphold their side's 
policies as constitutional, but not the policies of the other side. 58 
Law professors expend a lot of energy contesting the characteri-
zations and findings of social scientists, 59 but it is hard for them 
to dispel the impression left by debate after debate that what is 
up for grabs in these cases are the outcomes of judicial disputes. 60 
Neither side in the debate concedes that the other's criteria for 
judicial selection are legitimate. 
53. ld. 
54. See, e.g., id. at S8528 (statement of Sen. Sessions). 
55. See id. at S8527 (statement of Sen. Sessions). 
56. See, e.g., Michael R. Dimino, Pay No Attention to That Man Behind the Robe: Ju-
dicial Elections, the First Amendment, and Judges as Politicians, 21 YALE L. & POL 'Y REV. 
301, 304 (2003); Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Court as a Strategic National Policy-
maker, 50 EMORY L.J. 583, 583--84 (2001). See generally JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. 
SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002); Michael J. 
Gerhardt, Judicial Decisionmaking: Attitudes About Attitudes, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1733 
(2003) (reviewing SEGAL & SPAETH, supra). 
57. See Dimino, supra note 56, at 304; see also Epstein, supra note 56, at 584--85 (ar-
guing that justices "effectuate their own policy and institutional goals" by also taking into 
account the "goals and likely actions of the members of the other branches"). 
58. See, e.g., 150 CONG. REC. S8588 (daily ed. July 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. 
Leahy). 
59. See, e.g., Gerhardt, supra note 56, at 1733. 
60. See id. at 1741. 
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Indeed, confirmation contests reflect all too clearly the absence 
of consensus on what qualifies someone as a good judge or Jus-
tice. When one side derides the other for favoring activists, it is 
charging them with appointing people who will put their views 
ahead of, or in place of, the law.61 The ensuing disagreements are 
likely to be discouraging to young people who might be inclined to 
think each side is interested in merit. While President George W. 
Bush defends each ofhis nominees on the grounds ofmerit,62 it is 
hard to take him at his word. He has been careful not to define 
precisely what he means by "merit." He has left it to senators 
(and others) to infer his nominating criteria. Hence, Democrats 
plausibly infer two things from his judicial nominations-they 
have been largely picked on the bases of ideology and youth.63 
President Bush's nominees all seem to share a common ideol-
ogy-none is pro-choice or gay or in favor of affirmative action in 
any form. 64 At least one nominee-Charles Pickering, Sr.-is one 
of the most often reversed district judges in his circuit.65 Some 
have strong records in public service or in law school, but most 
are less than fifty-five years old.66 President Bush is rapidly ap-
proaching the point of having appointed the youngest appellate 
court judges in history. 67 
61. See, e.g., 150 CONG. REC. S8588 (daily ed. July 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. 
Leahy). 
62. President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President During Federal Judicial 
Appointees Announcement, (May 9, 2001), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 
2001/05/20010509-3.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2005). 
63. DiTullio & Schochet, supra note 5, at 1113-15; ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, JUDICIAL 
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II. 
There are several possible causes for the increasing resem-
blance between judicial selection and Talk Radio. One may be the 
twenty-four-hour news cycle on cable. The proliferation of media 
outlets has arguably made it harder for someone to get on televi-
sion, cable, or in news print if he or she makes relatively bland, 
deliberate statements. Instead, visibility depends a great deal on 
drama. The more dramatic someone is, the more likely he or she 
can make the news. A number of studies show that the media is 
reporting less hard news-facts and figures-and more soft 
news-speculation and commentary.68 
A second possible cause is the need for both candidates and in-
terest groups to raise money. Campaign finance reform has not 
eliminated the need and thus the incentive for senators or inter-
est groups to condemn the other side as extremist. This kind of 
characterization helps them solicit money, particularly from their 
base. 
Yet another possible cause in the increasing resemblance be-
tween Talk Radio and confirmation contests is the disappearing 
middle in the Senate.69 The Senate no longer resembles how it 
looked in the 1980s.70 Today, there are fewer people who charac-
terize themselves as moderates in either party, and voting along 
party-lines has been increasing.71 The disappearing moderate 
middle in the Senate makes it harder to find common ground. 
A fourth possible cause is the high stakes involved in judicial 
selection. As I have indicated, each side is painfully aware that 
we are in the midst of the second longest period in our history 
without a vacancy arising on the Supreme Court.72 Moreover, 
each side is aware of the fact that it has become a norm for circuit 
court judges to be the pool from which to select Supreme Court 
nominees.73 The last nominees to the Court to come straight from 
68. See Global Blinders; The End of the Cold War Hastened a Retreat from Foreign 
News-Until September 11, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Nov.illec. 2001, at 110 (discussing 
the "intensified soft-news phenomenon"). 
69. See Sarah A. Binder, The Disappearing Political Center: Congress and the Incredi-
ble Shrinking Middle, BROOKINGS REV., Fall1996, at 36, 38-39. 
70. Id. at 36, 39. 
71. Id. at 39. 
72. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
73. Lee Epstein eta!., The Norm of Prior Judicial Experience and Its Consequences for 
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private or governmental practice were Lewis Powell and William 
Rehnquist in 1971.74 Hence, each side has come to believe that it 
might be easier to defeat a potential nominee to the Court the 
first time he is nominated rather than wait for the higher-profile 
moment when he might be nominated to the Court from a circuit 
court judgeship (for which the Senate has confirmed him).75 
Moreover, each side recognizes that the federal circuit courts 
have the final say over the vast majority of cases they decide. 76 
III. 
The remaining question is whether reform of the judicial selec-
tion process is possible. Reform of the process has been rare, but 
it is not, as some might be disposed to say, unprecedented.77 To 
begin with, education of the public is essential. It is important for 
people to understand the genuine stakes in judicial selection and 
particularly how to stem the collapse of the process into Talk Ra-
dio. For instance, few people, outside of the nation's Capitol, are 
probably aware that the Senate has approved the vast majority of 
the President's judicial nominations. 78 His record of success is, in 
fact, the best ever.79 
Moreover, it is a mistake to think that conflict is inevitable 
within the process. Conflict is a choice rather than an inevitabil-
ity. For example, Democrats reached an agreement with the 
President earlier this summer to allow twenty-five "non-
controversial" judicial nominations to be fully processed within 
the Senate in exchange for his agreeing not to make any recess 
Career Diversity on the U.S. Supreme Court, 91 CAL. L. REV. 903, 907 (2003). 
74. ld. at 906. 
75. See generally id. 
76. See Michael Wells, Naked Politics, Federal Courts Law, and the Canon of Accept-
able Arguments, 4 7 EMORY L.J. 89, 104 (1998). 
77. See, e.g., SHELDON GoLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: ·LOWER COURT 
SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN 236-50 (1997) (describing President 
Jimmy Carter's reform of judicial selection). 
78. See generally 150 CONG. REC. S7744 (daily ed. July 7, 2004) (statement of Sen. 
Leahy) (stating that President George W. Bush's nominees are being confirmed at a rate 
higher than any recent president); see also Sheldon Goldman, Judicial Confirmation Wars: 
Ideology and the Battle for the Federal Courts, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 871, 904-08 app., 
tbls.1-5 (2005). 
79. See generally 150 CONG. REC. S7744 (daily ed. July 7, 2004) (statement of Sen. 
Leahy). 
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appointments of federal judges.80 Once these nominations go 
through, the federal judiciary, in Professor Carl Tobias's judg-
ment, "will be closer to full strength than at any time in the last 
13 years."81 Of course, this is no accident, given that the time pe-
riod to which Professor Tobias refers was the final year of Presi-
dent George H.W. Bush's administration.82 
Last but not least, one other thing needed in the process is 
greater, rather than lesser, deliberation. The President has ex-
cluded the American Bar Association from the selection process in 
order to expedite the confirmation of his nominees.83 He has been 
largely successful in achieving his objective, but at a price.84 For 
one thing, he has cut out the likeliest body that could keep the 
players honest.85 Moreover, speed is not necessarily a virtue in 
the selection process, and the American people are sometimes 
disserved when the President's party rubber stamps his nomi-
nees. For instance, President Bush insisted that the Senate 
quickly confirm his nominee, Jay Bybee, for a seat on the prestig-
ious United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.86 Some 
senators wanted to delay the nomination in order to find out more 
about what Bybee had done as the head of the prestigious Office 
of Legal Counsel in the Justice Department.87 The Justice De-
partment refused to release memos he had written or authorized 
addressing the President's obligations to comply with federal or 
international law on torture.88 Without this information, Republi-
80. See, e.g., Helen Dewar, President, Senate Reach Pact on Judicial Nominations; 
Bush Vows He Won't Use Recess Appointments; 25 to Get Vote, WASH. POST, May 19, 2004, 
atA21. 
81. Carl W. Tobias, Deal Creates Respite, NAT'L L.J., June 7, 2004, at 23. 
82. See id. 
83. See Letter from Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to President George W. Bush, to Mar-
tha W. Bamett, President, American Bar Association (Mar. 22, 2001), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/03/20010322-5.html (last visited Jan. 22, 
2005) (declaring the termination of ABA approval); see also Laura E. Little, The ABA's 
Role in Prescreening Federal Judicial Candidates: Are We Ready to Give up on the Law-
yers?, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 37, 37-38 (2001); Terry Carter, Squeeze Play: Bush Acts 
to Limit ABA Role in Screening Judicial Nominations, A.B.A. J., May 2001, at 18; Jona-
thon Groner, ABA Adjusts to Role on Judges, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 5, 2002, at 10. 
84. See 150 CONG. REC. S8589 (daily ed. July 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
85. See Little, supra note 83, at 51-53. 
86. See generally 149 CONG. REC. S3679-80 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 2003) (statement of 
Sen. Ensign) (declaring the nomination of JayS. Bybee, of Nevada, to be a judge on the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit). 
87. See 150 CONG. REC. S7547 (daily ed. July 6, 2004) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
88. See id. 
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cans pushed the nomination through the Senate. 89 The problem is 
that, a few months later, the administration released the memo-
randa sought by the Democrats.90 Moreover, it did so only after 
the White House Counsel, in an extraordinary move, publicly re-
jected the memoranda as too "abstract" or too "academic."91 There 
is no doubt whatsoever that Democrats never would have allowed 
the Bybee nomination to reach the Senate floor had they received 
the documents they had requested.92 It is possible that some Re-
publicans might have been troubled, too. 
*** 
President Bush, Senator John Kerry, and other senators have 
not yet avoided their political accountability for what they have 
done or not done on judicial nominations, the Iraq War, and other 
matters. The political accountability of our leaders serves as a 
principal check on what people do in the judicial selection proc-
ess. Presidents and senators often act the way they do in this 
process because, to paraphrase President Clinton, they can.93 If 
you want greater consensus within this process, then you might 
want to vote for a president capable of statesmanship--someone 
who really is, to coin a phrase, a uniter, rather than a divider. 
Whether judicial selection continues to be like Talk Radio or 
whether we can restore more dignity to it depends, in the end, on 
our remembering what the sign that sat on President Harry 
Truman's desk said-the buck stops here. 
89. See id. 
90. See id. 
91. Toni Locy & Joan Biskupic, Interrogation Memo to Be Replaced; Justice Dept. Offi· 
cial Calls Legal Advice Overly Broad, USA TODAY, June 23, 2004, at 2A. 
92. See 150 CONG. REC. 8754 7 (daily ed. July 6, 2004) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
93. See, e.g., Howard Kurtz, Bill Clinton's Very Personal Reflections: In '60 Minutes' 
Interview, Ex-President Calls Affair 'Terrible Moral Error', WASH. POST, June 17, 2004, at 
C1 (stating that when Bill Clinton was asked why he had an extramarital affair with 
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Dan's Midlife Adventure, WASH. POST, July 6, 2004, at Fl. 
